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Abstract. Empirical studies on industry lobbying sometimes reveal that certain firms within an
industry behave atypically in that they promote cost driving regulations like, e.g., environmental
standards. For analysing this phenomenon of 'strategic lobbying
1, the present paper combines a
heterogeneous Cournot-Nash oligopoly with a model of endogenous policy making where two
parties compete for campaign contributions spent by the regulated industry. It is shown that the
existence of potential regulation gains (and consequently the incentive for strategic lobbying
activities) depends on the relationship between possible cost differentials and the market struc-
ture of the industry under consideration. Based on these results, the paper examines the effects
of strategic lobbying for two different scenarios. The first scenario assumes that only one firm is
engaged in lobbying, whereas the second scenario looks at simultaneous (competing) lobbying
activities by several firms.
The authors are solely responsible for the contents of each Kiel Working Paper. Since the series
involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested readers are requested to direct criticism
and suggestions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with them.1. Introduction
Industry lobbying usually aims at erecting entry barriers against potential (foreign)
competitors or at preventing the introduction of costly regulations like, e.g., environ-
mental standards. Most of the theoretical work on this issue assumes that the industry
under consideration acts as a single coalition with the same interest.
1 In practice, how-
ever, it can sometimes be observed that certain firms within an industry behave atypi-
cally in that they lobby for a cost driving tightening of regulations.
2 As pointed out by
Oster (1982), the explanation of such an - at first glance inconsistent - behaviour lies
in the fact that administrative regulations often impose different costs on the firms
within an industry. Consequently, for some of these firms it might pay to lobby for a
tightening of regulations which would be to their own comparative cost advantage.
What is the appropriate theoretical framework for analysing this kind of strategic lob-
bying behaviour? In monopoly, there are no rivals to be hurt by a tightening of regula-
tions, and perfect competition by definition prohibits any influence on the political pro-
cess. Consequently, the natural habitat of strategic lobbying is oligopoly. Moreover, in
order to give rise for strategic lobbying activities, there must be some differences bet-
ween the oligopolists' cost structures. And finally, there must be some barriers to entry
to the considered industry because otherwise any profits created by lobbying activities
would be dissipated by the entry of new firms (see Oster, 1982). Hence, the economic
part of a model for analysing strategic lobbying behaviour should portray a heteroge-
neous oligopoly that is - at least up to a certain degree - protected by barriers to entry.
The political part of a model for analysing strategic lobbying behaviour should cover
the interactions between the political sector and the regulated industry as well as the
interactions within the political sector. An approach particularly suited to match these
requirements is the interest-group-cum-electoral-competition approach developed by
Young and Magee (1986) land Austen-Smith (1987).
3 This approach extends the tradi-
tional rent-seeking models based on Tullock (1967) by introducing competition bet-
* I wish to thank Frank Stahler for helpful comments. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.
1 See, e.g., Magee et al. (1989), Ursprung (1991), Bartsch et al. (1993) and Moore and Sura-
novic (1993). The only exception seems to be an earlier work of Oster (1982) that allows
for different cost structures within the lobbying industry.This paper, however, remains on
a more nontechnical level and the political sector is not explicitely modelled.
2 For empirical examples see, e.g., Oster (1982) on the american pharmaceuticals industry
and The Economist (January 8, 1994) on the british the waste management industry.
3 For a review of the different approaches to modelling endogenous policy making in the
presence of interest groups see Ursprung (1991).ween political parties. The latter aim at maximising their probability of election that in
turn depends on the amount of campaign contributions received from-interest groups
and other sources.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a model of en-
dogenous policy making with industry lobbying that follows the line described above.
Section 3 discusses the conditions that have to be satisfied in order to give rise for
strategic lobbying activities. Based on these results, Section 4 analyses the case of
unilateral lobbying by a single firm, and Section 5 analyses the case of competing lob-
bying activities. Section 6 closes the paper with some conclusions and prospects for
further research.
2. The Model
Consider a situation of electoral competition between two parties i=h,l. Each of them
announces a policy programme which includes a certain regulation (e.g., an emission
standard) that imposes costs on the industry under consideration. The level of regula-
tion proposed by party i is denoted by s;. Party h, the 'high regulation'-party, prefers a
higher level than party /, the 'low regulation'-party (i.e. s/j>s/). Both parties, however,
have to comply with a set of legal and technical constraints that constitutes a lower
bound ss:0 and an upper bound s >s The probability of winning the election, w^, de-
pends on the share of campaign contributions Z; received by party i (see, e.g., Ur-
sprung, 1991):
j ifZ, + Zh>0,
Wt=\o.s ifzl+zh=o.
The coefficient x;>0 denotes the relative productivity of campaign contributions. E.g.,
x/>x/j would imply that one dollar spent by party / "buys more votes" than one dollar
spent by party h. Campaign contributions Z; are composed of z;, the amount of finan-
cial support received from the industry under consideration, and z°, the amount of fi-
nancial support received from other sources: Zpz°+z;. It is assumed that there are no
strategic interactions between the industry under consideration and other donors of
campaign contributions. Consequently, z\ and z° are exogenous, whereas z^ and z/
depend on the chosen level of regulation sz-. In determining sz- the parties play a Nash-
game, i.e. each party chooses s; as to maximise its probability of election, w;, under
the assumption that the other party's s; is given. To connect this political part of the
model with its economic part (see below), the analysis follows the seminal work ofBrock and Magee (1974) and assumes that the parties act as Stackelberg leader, i.e. in
determining s; they anticipate the lobbying payments from the regulated industry.
The industry under consideration is composed of two types of firms which produce a
homogenous good: a single firm 1 that produces the output y± and n identical firms
k=2,3,...,n+l that produce the aggregate output nyk. Market entry of potential competi-
tors is restricted by entry barriers like, e.g., patent rights or licensing requirements.
Production cost of firm j (j=l,k)4 are composed of fixed cost F:S;O and constant mar-
ginal cost Cj(s) that depend on the actual level of regulation: dCj(s)/ds>0, d
2C;(s)/ds
2&0.
Moreover, it is assumed that firm 1 employs a superior production technology which
guarantees for any level of regulation se[s,s ] that firm 1 has lower marginal cost than
its competitors, i.e. c1(s)<ck(s).
Aggregate output is denoted by y and market demand is given by the linear inverse de-
mand function p(y) = a-b-y. For any given level of regulation s, each firm j maximises
its profit.Jtj(s) = [p(y)-Cj(s)]yj-Fj by choosing y-. under the assumption that the output of
the rest of the industry is given. Based on the outcome of this Cournot-Nash game, the
firms engaged in lobbying determine their optimal level of campaign contribution by
maximising their expected profit w/-jt;(s/)+w^-jtj(s/j) minus political outlays.
The overall structure of the present model is thus described by a two-stage game with-
in the regulated industry and a one-stage game between the competing political parties,
where both games are connected by the above Stackelberg assumption. In the follow-
ing Section, the relationship between the level of regulation and the firms' profits in
Cournot-Nash equilibrium will be derived. Based on these results, the model will be
used to analyse strategic lobbying behaviour within two different scenarios: Section 4
assumes that only firm 1 is engaged in lobbying, whereas Section 5 analyses the case
of simultaneous (competing) lobbying activities by all firms in the industry.
3. Regulation Gains and the Incentive for Strategic Lobbying
Profit maximisation by the firms leads to the reaction functions yi[yk(s)] and yk[yi(s)]
which can be solved for the Cournot-Nash-equilibrium in output:^
(2) v (s) = (s)
b(n + 2) '
 ykK
 } b(n + 2)
Note that the index 'j' refers to all firms j=l,2,..,n+l, whereas the index 'k' refers only to
the n identical firms k=2,3,..,n+l.
For ease of notation, the optimal values of variables are not marked by additional symbols.Assuming a>[(n+2)(bFk)
1/
2+2ck(s)-c1(s)] guarantees an interior solution with non neg-
ative profits that are given by Jtj(s) = byj(s)
2-Fj. Differentiating it^s) with respect to s
reveals that firm 1 gains from a marginal tightening in regulation (i.e. cbti(s)/ds>0) if




 v (s)/ds n
Hence, the existence of regulation gains and consequently the incentive for strategic
lobbying depends on the relationship between market structure and compliance cost:
The more atomised are the competitors (i.e. the larger is n), the smaller is the cost ad-
vantage of firm 1 that is needed to create an incentive for strategic lobbying. The eco-
nomic reasons for this link between market structure and lobbying behaviour are obvi-
ous: A tightening in regulation leads not only to a direct cost-increasing effect but also
to a rearrangement of market shares in favour of firm 1 that produces more efficient.
For a sufficiently large number of competing firms (or for a sufficiently large cost ad-
vantage, respectively), this increase in market share outweighs the direct effect on
costs such that the firm 1 gains gain from of a marginal tightening in regulation.
Figure 1. Regulation Gains in Cournot-Nash Equilibrium.However, in combining this result with the lobbying approach introduced in the last
Section, one caveat should be recognised: In general, it cannot be expected that Jti(s)
is monotonous in s, such that the above derived condition (3) applies only to marginal
changes in a given level of regulation, but it cannot readily be used to compare two
distinct levels s,- proposed by the two political parties. To overcome this possible in-
consistency, the remainder of the analysis assumes that the firms' compliance costs can
be described by exponential functions CJ(S)=CJSV with cjc>(n+l/n)cj>0 and y==l- This
specification guarantees not only monotonicity of Jtj(s), but it also facilitates an ex-
plicit solution to the firms' maximisation problem.
6 Figure 1 shows the resulting profit
functions.
4. Unilateral Lobbying Activities
This Section assumes that only firm 1 is able to influence the political process by cam-
paign contributions. The analysis will proceed in two steps. The first step determines
the optimal level of campaign contributions spent by firm 1, the second step analyses




In order to identify the optimal level of campaign contribution, firm 1 maximises its
expected profit w^(z/i)-Jti(s/j)+(l-w/j(z/j))-jti(s/) minus political outlays z/j. Differentiat-
ing the corresponding Lagrangean yields the following Kuhn-Tucker-condition:







e in profits under the two policies, i.e. Jti(s/j)-Jti(s/). The LHS
of (4) thus represents the change in expected profits caused by a marginal increase in
campaign contributions. Consequently, condition (4) states that for an equilibrium in
the interior (i.e. z^>0) marginal cost and benefits of lobbying are balanced: The last
Dollar spent on campaign contributions yields an increase in expected profits of just
one Dollar. Differentiating (1) with respect to z^, condition (4) can be solved for the
optimal amount of campaign contributions:
To avoid problems associated with market exit it migth further be assumed that the upper








Equation (5) shows that firm 1's incentive for strategic lobbying is driven by the dif-
ference in profits jt^s^Sj). However, it also turns out that a positive TC^S^SJ) alone
does not necessarily imply z^>0: Firm 1 will spend campaign contributions only if
JT-^S^SJ) is sufficiently large compared to the parties' exogenous financial endow-





Furthermore, (5) indicates that the 'effective' financial power of party /, x/zf, plays an
ambiguous role: For x/zf<x^(l/4)jt1(s, ,s,) condition (5) implies 3z/j/3z/°>0, i.e. an
exogenous increase in zf encourages firm 1 to spend more campaign contributions on
party h. However, if x/zf exceeds the critical level (l/4)x^jt1(s/l,s/), the reverse be-
comes true, i.e. an increase in zf discourages firm 1 in its lobbying behaviour.
Political Equilibrium under Stackelberg-Behaviour
Both parties aim at maximising their probability of election, w;, taking into account
firm l's lobbying behaviour as derived above. Assuming an interior solution, equations
(1) and (5) yield the following relationship between w/j and sf.
(7)
According to (7), maximising w^ for a given s/ requires to maximise KI(S^). Hence,
party h will always choose the upper bound s which yields the highest possible profit
for firm 1 (see Figure 1). However, party / knows that any payment from firm 1 to party
h would deteriorate w/. Consequently, party / will move towards party h's equilibrium
position s/j=s until JT^S^SJ) shrinks down to Q(zf ,z°h\ such that firm 1 has no more
incentive to spend campaign contributions. The equilibrium position of party I thus
satisfies the condition n1(s,,sl)=Q(zf,z^) as shown in Figure 2. Consequently, the lo-
cation of the political equilibrium depends on the market conditions (demand curve,
7 As indicated by (6), 7Ti(s/j,s/)>Q(z°,z^) implies that the first Dollar spent on campaign
contributions must yield more than one Dollar increase in expected profits.cost structures, number of firms) determining Jt^s^s^) as well as on the parties ex-
ogenous financial endowments determining Q(zf,z%). For given market conditions
(i.e. for a given JT^S^S^)), the difference between the two equilibrium positions de-
pends only on the parties' exogenous financial endowments: Party / will move the
closer towards party h, the smaller is Q(zf ,z£). Consequently, the existence of exoge-
nous financial sources serves as a corrective that restricts the lobbying firm's influence
on the political equilibrium.
Figure 2. Political Equilibrium in the Case of Unilateral Lobbying.
To sum up, in the case of unilateral lobbying Stackelberg behaviour by the parties
leads to concordance in the extreme: The high regulation party will propose the maxi-
mum level s~, and the low regulation party will move towards this position until the
lobbying firm has no more incentive to spend campaign contributions (given the parties
exogenous financial support). This outcome is highly comfortable for the lobbying
firm since it implies that in the political equilibrium there is in fact no need for posi-
tive lobbying payments. Instead, the mere threat of lobbying payments is sufficient to
discipline both parties. This situation, of course, changes completely if one considers
the case of competing lobbying activities which will be analysed in the next Section.5. Competing Lobbying Activities
In the case of competing lobbying activities, firm 1 will support the high regulation
party, whereas firms k=2,3,..,n+l will support the low regulation party. Denoting firm
j's campaign contribution by Zj, this implies Z/J=ZJ for party h and z/=n-zj{ for party /.
Optimising Lobbying Payments
In determining the optimal amount of lobbying payments, each firm j maximises its
expected profit minus political outlays under the assumption that the other firm's cam-
paign contributions are-given.
8 This Nash game leads to the reaction functions:
where rck(
s/i>
s/) denotes the (positive) difference in profits Jtk(s/)-%(s^).
9 Inserting
z/j=zi and z/ =n-Zk, these reactions functions can be reformulated in terms of z/j and z/:
zi(
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These functions describe the interdependencies between the amount of campaign
contributions received by the two parties. Again, the differences in profit, jt;(s^,s;),
turn out to be the driving force behind lobbying payments. Moreover, by calculating
the slope of z/j(z/), it can be shown that a marginal increase in the financial support
enjoyed by party / provokes firm 1 to spent more campaign contributions on the com-
peting party h as long as the effective financial power of party /, x/(z/+zf), does not
exceed (l/4)x^jti(s/j,s/). Beyond this critical level, however, an increase in z; causes
firm 1 to reduce its payments to party h. Analogous discouragement and encourage-
ment effects apply to the lobbying behaviour of the other firms (see Figure 3).
8 It it should carefully be noted that this game structure implies that the firms k=2,3,»,n+l
, are not able to coordinate their campaign contributions with each other.
9 For simplicity, this Section neglects boundary solutions. The conditions to be satisfied for
an interior solution are analogous to those discussed in the last Section.Figure 3. Strategic Interdependencies Between the Parties' Lobbying Earnings.
Before proceeding to calculate the Nash equilibrium in lobbying payments, it should
be noted that the reaction curves' intersections with the axis depend on the model para-
meters. In the special case of z°=z£=0 (i.e. no exogenous financial support), both re-
action curves pass through the origin such that they intersect each other twice. How-
ever, as indicated by (1), the intersection in the origin can be no equilibrium:
1
0 If there
are no exogenous financial sources and firm 1 does not lobby at all (i.e. z^=0), the
other firms are always better off, if they marginally invest in lobbying. Hence, there








Political Equilibrium under Stackelberg behaviour
Again, both parties aim at maximising their probability of election taking into account
the firms' lobbying payments as derived above. Inserting (10) into equation (1) yields
the following relationship between the parties political programme and their probabil-
ity of election:
Bartsch et al. (1993) have recently analysed a model on environmental legislation and
lobbying that can be viewed as a simplified version of the above special case.10
(11)
Hence, in choosing s/j, party h has to recognise that for a given s/ an increase in s/j
raises JL(S. ,s,) as well as Jt.(s, ,s,). Consequently, increasing s/j raises both parties'
lobbying earnings. Which one of these two opposite effects on w/j dominates, depends
on the respective elasticities:
dwh(sh,Si)\ . \d7l-,(sh,Si) sh dnk(sh,s{) sh dsh ) [ dsh nxisfrsi) dsh nk(shis{))
The appendix proofs that for s/j>s/ the elasticity of Jt-^s^s^) always exceeds the elas-
ticity of Jtk(s^,s/), such that dw/j/ds^ is always positive. Consequently, party h will
again chose the upper bound s which yields the highest possible profit for its clientele.
Analogously, it can be shown that dw//ds/ is always negative such that party / will al-
ways chose the lowest possible level of regulation, i.e. s/=s. Hence, the parties equi-
librium positions imply a kind of 'maximum product differentiation' with respect to
their political programmes. This outcome corresponds to Ursprung (1991) who shows
within a related interest-group approach that Stackelberg behaviour by political parties
can give rise to a process of political polarisation which cannot be explained by the
traditional median voter approach (see, e.g., Downs, 1957).
Finally, it may be asked which of the parties will be the winner of the above lobbying
game. Denoting the parties' initial probability of election by wf := x,zf / (x/zf + x^z£),
condition (11) implies that the net effect of the firms' competing lobbying activities
will increase the high regulation party's probability of election if the ratio between the
firms' incentive, for lobbying exceeds the ratio between the parties' exogenous financial
endowments: Jt1(s,s)/jtk(s,s)>z^/z^<=>w^(s,s)> w£. Using the profit functions
derived in Section 2, the ratio jt^s ,s)/jtk(s ,s) can be written as:
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Differentiating (14) with respect to n reveals that ^(s ,s)/jt. (s ,s) is monotonously in-
creasing in n. Consequently, for given exogenous financial support and for a given cost
differential, the final winner of the lobbying game depends on the market structure of
the regulated industry: An increase in the high (low) regulation party's probability of
election is the more likely, the higher (lower) is the number of competing firms.11
6. Conclusions
For analysing strategic industry lobbying, the present paper has combined a heteroge-
neous Cournot-Nash oligopoly with a model of endogenous policy making where a
'high regulation'-party h and a 'low regulation'-party / compete for campaign contribu-
tions spent by the regulated industry. The model assumes that all firms are identical ex-
cept- firm 1 that has lower marginal compliance costs than its competitors. As a result,
the existence of potential regulation gains - and consequently the incentive for strate-
gic lobbying behaviour - depends on the firm's cost advantage and on the number of its
competitors. Based on this outcome, the paper has examined the effects of strategic
lobbying behaviour for two different scenarios:
- The first scenario assumes that only firm 1 is able to influence the political process
by campaign contributions. In this case, Stackelberg behaviour by the parties leads to
'concordance in the extreme': Party h will propose the maximum possible level of re-
gulation and party / will move towards this position until the firm 1 has no more in-
centive to spend campaign contributions. Hence, in equilibrium the mere threat of
lobbying payments is sufficient to control both parties up to a certain degree.
- The second scenario assumes that not only firm 1 but also its competitors are en-
gaged in simultaneous (competing) lobbying activities. In this case, Stackelberg be-
haviour by the parties leads to 'political polarisation': Party / will propose the lowest
and party h will propose the highest possible level of regulation. Which of the par-
ties will be the ultimate winner of this contest for campaign contributions, depends
on firm l's cost advantage as well as on the number of its competitors.
Finally, it should be noted that the above results rely on the assumption of a given mar-
ket structure. As discussed in Section 1, industry lobbying cannot be explained without
assuming a certain degree of entry barriers. But nevertheless, one generally cannot ex-
clude that a change in regulations may change the market structure by attracting new
firms or by driving out some of the old firms. A possible route to incorporate an en-
dogenous market structure into the present model would be to assume free entry to the
group of firms employing the old technology. In this case, the number of firms in the
latter subgroup always satisfies the non-profit condition, such that any gains from lob-
bying would be dissipated by the entry of new firms. As a consequence, only the firm
employing the superior (protected) technology has an incentive for lobbying activities.
The determination of the optimal level of campaign contributions, however, becomes
more demanding because the lobbying firm has to take into account that a change in
regulation would lead to a change in the number of competing firms.12
Appendix
For ease of notation, the condition to be proven is written as Ei(s/j,S/)>Ek(s/j,S/) with:
dsh dsh
For any given s^>0, E;(s/,,S/) can be considered as a (decreasing) function of s/. Insert-
ing the profit functions derived in Section 2, differentiating with respect to s/ yields:

















with ei:=n-C2-(n+l)ci and ek:=2c2-ci. Due to the assumption a>e/c-s^ (see Section 3),
Ej(sJ,,s/) is positive, whereas its first derivative dti(s'h,si)/ds[ is negative.













 steP shows that 8i(s^,s/) and £k(s/,,s/) have a common tangent in
spS/, with E^= £2=0; the fourth step shows that £k(s^,s/) is concave, and the fifth step
shows that there exist a §/ >0 such that Ei(sjj,s^) is concave for s/<S/ and convex for
s/>S;. Combining together these five steps imply that there can be no intersection be-
tween E1(s^,s/) and Ek(s^,s/) for s/<s'^ such that E1(s},,s/)>Ek(s^,S/) (see Figure A.I).
This line of argumentation holds for any given S/j>0.






7 )((a +1^ )
2 - a
2). Multiplying, cancelling of identical terms and divid-
ing by ae1ekS/(
2
Y yields: 2e1 - e2 >&i - 2e2. For C2>c^, this condition is satisfied.







y). Multiplying, rearranging and cancelling of identical terms
yields: (e^ + e2)s{j
7 >(&i + e2)s!
7. For s/<s^, this condition is always satisfied.13 ibliofhek
e
Figure A.I. Relationship between EI(S^,S/) and £k(s;j,s/).
Step 3. Inserting s/=s^ into (A.2) and (A.3) respectively, yields Ei(s/=S/,)=Ek(s/=S/,)=0
and 3E1(s/l,s/)/as/=a8k(s/ps/)/as/. Hence, E1(sJ,,s/) and £k(s/,,s/) have a common tangent in £1(s/=s;)=Ek(s/=s^)=0.
Step 4. Differentiating d£k(s/,,s/)/ds/ with respect to s/ yields the second derivative
(A.4) d
2ek(S'h,Sl)/dSl






2. Due to co>0, y^l and a>ejts^5 a2ek(s^,s/)/3s;
2 is
negative, i.e. Ek(sjj,s/) is concave.
Step 5. Differentiating dEi(s),,s/)/ds/ with respect to s/ yields the second derivative
(A.5) d
2e1(s'h,sl)ldsl
2 =ca(a + e1s'hr)[(2y-l)elsi -(y-l)a\
where co is defined as above. The sign of d
2£i(s/pS/)/3s/
2 thus depends on the magni-
tude of s/. Defining 5/:=[a(Y-l)/ek(2Y-l)]
1/X equation (A.5) implies that E1(s)l,s/) is
concave for S/<Sj and convex for s/>§/.,14
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